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Abstract	Recent	developments	in	the	scientific	realism	debate	have	resulted	in	a	form	of	‘exemplar	driven’	realism	that	eschews	general	‘recipes’	and	instead	focuses	on	the	specific,	‘local’	reasons	for	adopting	a	realist	stance	in	particular	theoretical	contexts.	Here	I	suggest	that	such	a	move	highlights	even	more	sharply	the	need	for	the	realist	to	incorporate	a	health	dose	of	metaphysics	in	her	position,	particularly	when	it	comes	to	the	theories	associated	with	modern	physics.	Turning	to	another	set	of	recent	developments,	having	to	do	with	the	relationship	between	metaphysics	and	science,	I	argue	that	the	exemplar	driven	realist	can	appropriate	certain	current	metaphysical	devices	to	help	make	concrete	her	commitments.	Specifically	I	focus	on	a	kind	of	exemplar	based	structural	realism	and	examine	the	adequacy	of,	first,	the	determinables-determinate	relationship	as	presented	by	Wilson	and,	second,	Paul’s	‘one	category	ontology,	as	such	devices	within	this	framework.	
		
Introduction	This	paper	sits	at	the	intersection	of	two	recent	debates:	the	first	concerns	the	contrast	between	so-called	‘recipe’	realism	and	an	exemplar	driven	form	(Saatsi	2016),	whereas	the	second	has	to	do	with	the	relationship	between	metaphysics	and	science	(Callender	2011;	Ladyman	and	Ross	2007).	In	essence	it	represents	an	attempt	to	delineate	a	more	moderate,	‘third’	way	in	each	debate,	using	the	example	of	structural	realism	to	give	concrete	form	to	this	attempt.			 I	shall	begin	by	outlining	‘exemplar-driven’	realism	which	has	been	offered	as	an	alternative	to	the	traditional,	‘recipe-based’	framework.	As	an	example	of	a	form	of	realism	that	adheres	to	the	latter,	structural	realism	has	been	held	up	for	criticism	and	I	shall	argue	that	this	criticism	is	either	unwarranted	or	can	be	accommodated.	In	effect,	I	shall	suggest	that	structural	realism	can	be	articulated	as	an	exemplar-driven	project.	However,	when	it	comes	to	the	relevant	examples,	it	is	metaphysical	considerations	that	crucially	motivate	the	shift	to	structures	and	this	takes	us	into	the	second	debate.		 A	number	of	commentators	have	noted	the	apparent	divergence	of	much	of	current	metaphysics	from	modern	science.		Metaphysicians	have	been	admonished	for	failing	to	pay	attention	to	developments	in	modern	science,	especially	physics,	and	various	metaphysical	devices,	principles	and	theories	have	been	taken	to	be	ruled	out	by	these	developments.	However,	French	and	McKenzie	(2012,	2015)	have	argued	that	metaphysics	may	yet	have	instrumental	value	in	providing	a	kind	of	toolbox	that	philosophers	of	science	can	use	for	their	own	ends.	In	particular,	I	shall	suggest	that	metaphysics	offers	an	array	of	tools	that	the	realist	can	deploy	to	help	make	good	on	the	claim	that	science	offers	a	view	of	how	the	world	is,	and	not	just	how	it	could	be.	And	in	particular	I	shall	argue	that	these	tools	can	help	the	structural	realist	further	articulate	her	position	and	respond	to	various	criticisms	and	concerns.		
Exemplar-driven	Realism	In	a	recent	analysis,	Saatsi	has	argued	that	the	realism	debate	is	in	the	grip	of	what	he	calls	‘recipe	realism’,	where	such	a	recipe	is	‘…	capable	of	distilling	the	trustworthy	aspects	of	a	theory,	applicable	to	any	good,	predictively	successful	mature	theory.	’	(2016	p.	???;	see	also	Asay	2016).	The	example	he	gives	(indeed,	which	leads	the	paper),	is	that	of	structural	realism,	according	to	which	the	structural	realist	insists	that	given	any	empirically	successful,	mature	theory,	it	will	‘get	the	structure	right’.	Of	course	other	examples	can	be	given	–	the	entity	realist	will	insist	that	such	theories	nail	down	the	right	entities,	the	dispositionalist	semi-realist	will	insist	that	they	get	the	relevant	bundles	of	dispositional	properties	‘right’	and	so	on	–	but	they	are	all	akin	in	spirit	by	virtue	of	proposing	some	abstract	schema	for	capturing	the	truth-content	of	our	best	theories	or,	more	generally,	characterising	the	sense	in	which	such	theories	‘latch	onto’	the	world.			 Thus,	structural	realists	express	their	epistemic	commitments	in	such	general	terms:	‘all	that	we	know	is	structure’.	And	in	that	spirit,	the	debate	then	focuses	on	the	letter	of	how	that	notion	of	structure	may	be	metaphysically	characterised	and	represented.	Some,	such	as	Worrall	(1989),	have	tended	to	highlight	the	relevant	equations	and	deploy	Ramsey	sentences	as	
representational	devices,	whereas	‘ontic’	structural	realists	(Ladyman	and	Ross	2007;	French	2014)	have	emphasised	symmetries	and	the	associated	group-theoretic	structure	and	have	used	the	semantic	approach	to	represent	these	features	of	theories.	But	Saatsi	argues	that	the	underlying	approach	is	the	same:	to	give	a	general	recipe	that	can	be	applied	to	any	historical	episode	or	any	new	scientific	development	(that	meets	the	realists’	general	criteria	of	empirical	success,	maturity	etc.).			 Thus,	the	aim	of	recipe	realism	is	‘…to	capture	theories’	epistemic	commitments	across	a	wide	range	of	disciplines	and	different	areas	of	scientific	theorising	in	unified	terms,	offering	recipes	or	algorithms	that	are	first	motivated	by	particular	considerations	and	case-studies,	and	then	optimistically	projected	well	beyond	those	to	the	rest	of	science.’		(Saatsi	2016,	p.	???).	However,	Saatsi	argues,	this	aim	is	thwarted	for	a	number	of	reasons:	first	of	all,	the	sheer	diversity	of	science	and	the	inhomogeneity	of	theorising	suggests	that	there	is	really	little	reason	to	expect	that	one	recipe	will	fit	all	disciplines.	Of	course	the	very	abstract	nature	of	these	recipes	may	delude	their	advocates	into	viewing	science	as	more	homogenous	than	it	actually	is,	but	to	expect	that	theories	in	high	energy	physics,	on	the	one	hand,	and	immunology,	on	the	other,	‘latch	onto	reality’	in	the	same	way	is	surely	unwarranted.		 Furthermore,	Saatsi	continues,	the	fact	that	we	have	so	many	different	realist	recipes	should	give	us	pause;	perhaps,	instead	of	thinking	of	them	as	competitors,	we	should	regard	them	from	a	pluralistic	perspective	as	capturing	the	different	possible	ways	that	a	theory	can	‘get	the	world	right’	–	i.e.	get	it	right	in	its	structural	aspects,	in	its	causal	aspects	and	so	on.	But	of	course,	the	fact	that	each	recipe	fits	certain	cases	gives	no	reason	to	think	it	can	be	‘projected’	even	within	that	particular	science,	much	less	across	disciplines,	nor	that	the	other	recipes	are	somehow	ruled	out	across	the	board.			 And	the	very	abstract	nature	of	such	recipes	means	they	actually	say	little	about	precisely	how	the	theories	concerned	latch	onto	reality.	Again,	in	the	case	of	structural	realism,	to	give	content	to	the	recipe	the	nature	of	the	structure	that	is	appealed	to	must	be	spelled	out	but	this	has	proven	contentious,	or	so	it	is	claimed.	Here	we	have	the	contrasting	examples	of	Ramsey	sentences	and	the	semantic	approach,	and	it	is	argued	that	‘[i]t	is	entirely	unclear	why	these	recipes	should	in	general	be	at	all	good	for	discerning	something	that	will	be	carried	over	in	various	theory	changes,	something	that	furthermore	genuinely	accounts	for	the	past	theories’	empirical	success.’	(ibid.,	p.	???)	Even	giving	illustrative	exemplars	such	as	the	famous	Fresnel	case	or	phlogiston,	is	of	little	help,	since	they	may	pull	in	different	directions,	thereby	watering	down	the	content	of	the	recipe;	after	all,	in	what	sense	can	‘the	structure’	in	the	case	of	light	and	phlogiston	be	the	same?		 Nevertheless,	Saatsi	agrees	that	focussing	on	such	exemplars	is	the	way	to	go	–	except	he	recommends	giving	up	on	the	recipe	entirely:	‘Recipe	realists	are	right	in	leaning	heavily	on	exemplars	in	explicating	their	realist	commitments,	but	they	go	wrong	in	trying	to	generate	a	general	recipe	that	captures	the	gist	of	those	exemplars.	’	(ibid.,	p.	???)	Instead,	we	should	regard	realism	in	general	in	terms	of	adherence	to	the	‘positive	attitude’	that	theories’	empirical	success	is	due	to	their	getting	something	right	about	the	world	and	specific	exemplars	then	give	content	to	this	attitude	by	specifying	what	that	something	is,	with	no	expectation	that	it	can	be	exported	to	other	theories	within	that	discipline,	much	
less	across	disciplines.	Thus	we	have	a	global	attitude,	applied	locally	and	as	Saatsi	notes,	this	gives	new	meaning	to	the	‘divide	et	impere’	slogan	that	also	underpins	structural	realism.		 Now,	there	is	much	that	is	positive	about	this	suggested	reorientation	of	the	realism	debate.	And	indeed,	despite	being	held	up	as	an	example	of	‘recipe	realism’,	there	seems	little	to	prevent	structural	realism	from	being	articulated	within	the	framework	of	‘exemplar	realism’.	Although	the	epistemic	form	of	structural	realism	was	indeed	originally	presented	as	a	general	and	perhaps	abstract	response	to	the	Pessimistic	Meta-Induction	(Worrall	op.	cit.),	the	ontic	variant	allies	that	response	to	an	attempt	to	accommodate	the	specific	metaphysical	implications	of	quantum	mechanics	(Ladyman	1998).	And	as	has	been	noted	(French	2006),	that	alliance	may	in	fact	come	apart.	Consider:	towards	the	end	of	his	classic	paper,	Worrall	speculated	that	his	form	of	structural	realism	might	be	extended	to	quantum	physics.	Now,	although	attempts	have	been	made	to	articulate	an	appropriate	sense	of	continuity	between	classical	and	quantum	mechanics	(see	Saunders	1993,	French	2014	pp.	15-20),	it	might	be	argued	that	such	attempts	can	only	be	deemed	to	be	successful	to	the	extent	that	we	accept	a	certain	‘plasticity’	in	the	relevant	structures	(so	that	the	Poisson	brackets	of	classical	mechanics	can	be	deemed	to	be	appropriately	related	to	the	Moyal	brackets	on	the	quantum	side	for	example;	see	French	ibid.).	If	one	were	to	conclude	that	the	bridge	between	the	two	is	just	too	tenuous	one	might	then	be	inclined	to	conclude	that	either	one	should	acknowledge	that	the	structures	one	should	be	realist	about	are	different	in	the	classical	and	quantum	cases,	with	no	relevant	continuity	between	them	(and	hence	convergent	realism	is	in	trouble,	as	Laudan	famously	suggested),	or	that	if	one	has	grounds	to	be	a	structural	realist	when	it	comes	to	quantum	physics,	one	may	have	no	such	grounds	in	the	classical	context,	where	one	should	be	an	entity	realist	perhaps.	This	second	option	would	certainly	fit	with	exemplar	realism.		 And	of	course,	setting	aside	the	issue	of	responding	to	the	Pessimistic	Meta-Induction,	the	relevant	grounds	for	shifting	to	structures	will	vary	both	within	a	particular	discipline,	such	as	physics,	and	between	disciplines,	such	as	physics	and	biology.	Thus	when	it	comes	to	quantum	mechanics,	part	of	the	original	motivation	for	ontic	structural	realism	concerned	the	perceived	metaphysical	underdetermination	between	the	views	of	particles	as	individuals	and	as	non-individuals,	both	of	which	are	supported	by	the	relevant	quantum	statistics	(see	Ladyman	1998;	Ladyman	and	Ross	2007;	French	and	Ladyman	2011;	French	2014).	In	response	to	van	Fraassen’s	conclusion	that	such	underdetermination	undermined	the	realist’s	position,	it	was	argued	that	it	could	be	effectively	dissolved	by	giving	up	on	the	underlying	object-oriented	metaphysics	and	claiming	that,	to	repeat	the	slogan,	‘all	that	there	is,	is	structure’	(Ladyman	1998).	This	is	less	a	‘recipe’	than	a	metaphysical	commitment	that	of	course	then	needs	to	be	cashed	out.			 However,	that	cashing	out	of	what	is	meant	by	‘structure’	should	not	be	understood	in	terms	of	Ramsey	sentences	or	set-theoretic	structures	or	category	theory	or	whatever.	As	French	(2014	Ch.	5)	emphasises,	these	are	the	devices	that	we	use	as	philosophers	of	science	to	represent,	for	our	own	purposes	and	aims,	theories,	data	models,	programmes	and,	yes,	empirical	and	theoretical	structures.	But	our	realist	commitments	should	not	be	to	these	devices	in	and	of	themselves.	In	deploying	them	we	are	not	so	much	giving	content	to	the	relevant	
‘recipe’	as	using	a	meta-level	tool.	Thus	it	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	different	philosophers	of	science,	with	their	different	meta-level	commitments,	should	use	different	sets	of	such	tools.	Worrall,	for	example,	is	famously	antagonistic	towards	the	semantic	approach	and	thus	prefers	the	syntactic	formulation	of	Ramsey	sentences	to	capture	the	structural	commitments	manifested	at	the	object	level	of	the	theories	themselves	in	the	form	of	the	relevant	equations.		Others	have	opted	for	category	theoretic	frameworks	(Bain	2104;	Landry	2007),	although	these	have	been	criticised	for	failing	to	appropriately	represent	the	relevant	structural	features	(Lal	and	Teh	2015;	Lam	and	Wuthrich	2015).	And,	of	course,	the	set	theoretically	based	semantic	approach	has	long	been	advocated	as	an	appropriate	means	of	capturing	the	inter-theoretic	commonalities	that	are	claimed	to	form	the	basis	of	the	structural	realist’s	response	to	the	Pessimistic	Meta-Induction	(Ladyman	1998;	French	2014,	Ch.	5)		 Furthermore,	that	cashing	out	at	the	‘object	level’	of	the	science	itself	will	be	specific	to	the	relevant	theoretical	context.	Thus	in	the	context	of	the	theory	of	light	and,	subsequently,	electromagnetism,	the	relevant	structure	is	presented	by	Worrall	in	terms	of	the	equations	of	first,	Fresnel,	and	then	Maxwell	(and	beyond),	taken	to	be	interpreted	of	course.	And	although	we	find	such	features	as	Galilean	invariance	in	the	classical	context,	it	is	in	the	quantum	physics	that	symmetries	really	come	to	prominence,	beginning	with	the	permutation	invariance	that	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	quantum	statistics	underpinning	the	above	metaphysical	underdetermination.	And	just	as	the	laws	are	presented	mathematically	via	the	appropriate	differential	equations,	for	example,	these	symmetries	are	presented	via	the	mathematics	of	group	theory.	Hence	in	this	case	the	‘structure’	is	cashed	out	in	terms	of	the	relevant	laws	plus	symmetry	principles	(see	French	2014)1,	where	these	are	then	clothed	in	an	appropriate	metaphysics.			 Shifting	to	quantum	field	theory,	we	no	longer	have	the	original	motivation	in	the	form	of	the	above	metaphysical	underdetermination	(although	we	do	have	another	kind	of	underdetermination	in	the	form	of	fields-as-substantival	versus	fields-as-instantiated	properties)	but	we	still	understand	the	structure	in	play	through	a	combination	of	symmetries	and	laws,	with	the	Poincaré	symmetry	of	relativistic	space-time	playing	a	particularly	significant	role	(French	and	Ladyman	2003;	French	2014).	And	since	it	is	quantum	field	theory	that	provides	the	framework	for	the	Standard	Model	of	high-energy	physics,	we	can	again	cash	out	the	relevant	structure	via	laws	and	symmetries,	with	the	gauge	symmetries	involved	in	representing	interactions	now	added	to	the	mix	(French	2014)2.			 So,	in	one	sense,	we	don’t	have	the	same	recipe	cashed	out	in	each	case,	since	the	motivation	for	structural	realism	that	is	presented	in	the	context	of	quantum	mechanics	is	not	present	in	that	of	high-energy	physics,	where	the																																																									1	Actually,	following	Cassirer	the	structure	of	the	world	is	understood	in	terms	of	a	three-way	interwoven	complex	of	symmetries,	laws	and	determinate	phenomena	(French	ibid.).	2	Curiously,	Nounou	(2015)	suggests	that	ontic	structural	realism	is	almost	exclusively	focussed	on	quantum	mechanics	with	very	little	attention	paid	to	quantum	field	theory	and	hardly	any	at	all	to	high-energy	physics,	although	the	former	is	covered	in	French	and	Ladyman	(2003)	and	the	other	papers	in	the	special	issue	of	Synthese	in	which	this	appeared	(in	particular	Cao	2003	and	Saunders	2003),	as	well	as	in	French	(2014)	which	also	tackles	the	latter.		
motivation	has	more	to	do	with	the	way	that	fundamental	properties	such	as	spin	and	charge	effectively	‘drop	out’	of	the	relevant	symmetries.	But	of	course,	in	another	sense	it	can	be	alleged	that	we	do,	insofar	as	it	is	the	relevant	symmetries	that	are	focussed	on	in	each	case,	as	presented	in	the	theoretical	contexts	by	the	appropriate	groups.	However,	one	can	insist	in	response	that	this	is	entirely	driven	by	the	relevant	context	not	by	some	adherence	to	a	particular	realist	recipe:	it	is	because	of	the	framework	provided	by	quantum	field	theory	that	we	find	Poincaré	symmetry	also	playing	a	fundamental	role	in	the	context	of	the	Standard	Model	and	it	is	because	of	the	role	of	gauge	symmetries	more	generally	that	we	find	the	notion	of	structure	cashed	out	in	this	context	in	this	manner	as	well.	In	other	words,	what	appears	to	be	the	same	recipe	applied	again	and	again	is	in	fact	due	to	the	features	of	the	relevant	physical	theories.		 But	then	of	course	we	should	not	expect	these	same	features	to	be	exemplified	either	by	other	theories	within	physics	or	by	the	theories	of	other	disciplines.	So,	no	one	of	course	would	claim	that	when	it	comes	to	theories	of	light	and	phlogiston	the	structure	is	the	same.	Indeed,	insofar	as	the	latter	example	might	be	seen	as	falling	under	‘chemistry’	(and	here	we	might	need	to	be	sensitive	to	disciplinary	boundaries),	we	would	clearly	not	expect	to	encounter	the	same	equations	or	laws	much	less	any	symmetries	(see	French	2014	section	12.2).	Likewise	when	it	comes	to	biology,	where	we	not	only	have	no	symmetries	but	no	laws	either,	except	perhaps	for	natural	selection.	Nevertheless,	although	we	clearly	no	longer	have	the	motivation	for	shifting	away	from	objects	that	was	articulated	in	the	quantum	context,	the	kinds	of	concerns	with	the	nature	and	role	of	the	notion	of	‘organism’	and	biological	object	more	generally	that	have	been	articulated	by	Clarke,	Dupré	and	others	(see,	for	example,	the	papers	in	Guay	and	Pradeu	2016)	have	been	taken	to	power	a	similar	shift	from	understanding	biological	entities	in	object	oriented	ways	to	conceiving	of	them	in	terms	of	certain	kinds	of	biological	structures	and	processes	(French	2014	Ch.	12;	French	2016).	Again	it	might	be	emphasised	that	it	is	reflection	on	the	science	itself	rather	than	sticking	to	a	particular	realist	recipe	that	is	driving	these	moves.		 All	of	which	amounts	to	saying	that	in	certain	respects	structural	realism	is	already	exemplar-driven	and	there	seems	to	be	no	inherent	barrier	to	rendering	it	explicitly	so.	Thus,	from	this	perspective,	the	structuralist	would	acknowledge	that,	at	the	very	least,	the	motivations	and	reasons	for	this	shift	will	vary	from	context	to	context	and	discipline	to	discipline	and	indeed	that	in	some	cases	there	simply	will	be	no	such	grounds.	In	other	words,	whether	structural	realism	is	the	appropriate	stance	to	adopt	would	have	to	be	tested	on	a	case	by	case	basis.			 However,	if	our	realism	is	going	to	be	exemplar	based	then	there	is	even	greater	need	to	be	clear	on	what	it	is	we	are	going	to	be	realist	about.	Consider:	the	structural	realist	has	long	pointed	out	that	underlying	the	‘recipe’	of	standard	realism	is	a	certain	kind	of	‘object	orientation’.	In	effect	this	smuggles	in	an	implicit	metaphysics	so	that	when	the	standard	realist	declaims	‘I	am	a	realist	about	electrons’	and	is	then	pressed	on	what	these	electrons	are,	she	can	then	say	‘they	are	objects,	like	tables	and	chairs,	albeit	subject	to	the	laws	of	quantum	physics	which	make	them	behave	in	weird	ways	…’	As	far	as	the	structural	realist	is	concerned,	the	object	oriented	standard	realist	gets	away	with	a	lot	by	means	of	this	manoeuvre,	since	she	never	seems	to	face	the	equivalent	to	‘what	is	this	
‘structure’	of	which	you	speak?’;	that	is,	she	never	seems	to	have	to	answer	‘what	are	these	objects	that	electrons	are	supposed	to	be?’	In	other	words,	the	recipe	masks	the	underlying	metaphysics.			 If	that	mask	is	then	stripped	away	and	we	ground	our	realist	stance	in	distinct	exemplars,	then	we	cannot	get	away	with	keeping	the	metaphysics	implicit	–	it	must	be	stated	explicitly	in	each	case.	The	alternative	is	to	adhere	to	an	entirely	epistemic	form	of	realism	(or	what	Magnus	calls	‘shallow’	realism;	Magnus	2012)	which	would	amount	to	pointing,	if	pressed,	to	the	relevant	features	of	the	theory,	as	expressed	in	its	equations	or	models	or	whatever,	and	insisting	‘I	am	a	realist	about	that!’.	But	as	a	response	to	the	demand	to	say	how	the	world	is	according	to	the	theory,	that	hardly	seems	adequate.	Hence	we	need	to	appeal	to	some	appropriate	metaphysics	in	each	case.	The	question	then	is	how	to	avail	ourselves	of	that	metaphysics.		
Metaphysics	as	a	tool	for	the	realist	As	I	noted	in	the	introduction,	the	relationship	between	metaphysics	and	science	has	recently	come	under	scrutiny,	with	a	number	of	commentators	declaring	the	former	not	fit	for	purpose,	given	recent	developments	with	regard	to	the	latter.	This	rejection	proceeds	on	(at	least)	two	bases:	first	of	all,	many	of	the	big	debates	in	current	metaphysics,	such	as	monism	vs.	pluralism	or	fundamentality	vs.	gunk	seem	to	proceed	with	little	or	no	regard	to	the	impact	of	the	relevant	science.	At	best,	it	is	claimed,	when	science	is	dragged	into	the	debate,	it	is	in	the	form	of	a	crude,	long	since	discarded	picture,	amounting	to	little	more	than	high	school	chemistry	(Ladyman	and	Ross	op.	cit.).	Secondly,	a	number	of	the	concepts	and	principles	that	lie	at	the	core	of	modern	metaphysics	appear	to	have	been	ruled	out	of	court	by	developments	in	modern	science.			 Now	some	caveats	are	in	order	here.	With	regard	to	the	first	point,	it	has	to	be	said	that	not	all	metaphysicians	are	ignorant	of	developments	in	science.	Paul	and	Schaffer,	for	example,	have	both	appealed	to	features	of	quantum	mechanics	in	support	of	their	different	positions	(a	one-category	ontology	and	monism	respectively;	see	Paul	2013;	Schaffer	2013).	And	when	it	comes	to	the	second,	this	‘ruling	out’	is	not	always	definitive	(French	and	McKenzie	2015).	Take	Leibniz’s	Principle	of	Identity	of	Indiscernibles	for	example.	Following	French	and	Redhead	(1988)	it	has	long	been	held	to	be	violated	by	quantum	physics	yet	a	‘Quinean’	version	has	recently	been	constructed	that	is	compatible	with	the	physics	(Muller	and	Saunders	2008;	but	for	criticism,	see	Bigaj	and	Ladyman	2010).	However,	it	might	be	felt	that	these	are	exceptions	and	that	in	general	the	dismissal	of	much	of	current	metaphysics	by	philosophers	of	science	is	well	justified	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	simply	out	of	touch	with	modern	science		(think,	for	example,	of	the	way	the	notion	of	intrinsicality	is	usually	understood	in	terms	of	‘lonely	objects’	and	how	this	is	discussed	in	the	absence	of	any	consideration	as	to	whether	physics	can	even	accommodate	a	model	in	which	there	is	a	lone	particle	in	the	universe).			 Now	if	one	is	a	realist,	exemplar	based	or	otherwise,	seeking	to	articulate	a	locally	delineated	view	of	how	the	world	is,	what	are	one’s	options	given	the	above?		 One,	of	course,	is	simply	to	eschew	metaphysics	entirely	and	in	answer	to	the	question	‘what	is	the	world	like	according	to	theory	T?”,	to	simply	point	to	T,	set	out	in	all	its	glory	on	a	whiteboard,	say,	and	to	declare	‘That!	It	is	like	that!’.	
Now,	that	setting	out	will	typically	be	–	and	certainly	so	in	the	case	of	physical	theories	–	in	terms	of	the	relevant	mathematics	but	only	a	radical	Platonist	will	leave	it	at	that.	Physical	realists	will	of	course	insist	that	the	relevant	terms	must	be	interpreted,	and	those	in	eschewal	mode	will	further	insist	that	this	interpretation	will	be	‘purely’	physics	based.	Now	of	course,	purity	is	a	slippery	notion	but	one	can	imagine	our	eschewalling	realist	declaiming	‘That!	The	world	is	like	that!	Where	this	term	refers	to	the	electron	and	that	to	the	electro-magnetic	field	….’	and	refusing	to	say	anything	more.	But	of	course	the	door	to	metaphysics	has	already	been	opened	via	this	interpretation,	since	it	invites	the	further	question	‘Yes,	but	what	is	the	electron?	Is	it	a	particle?	Is	it	a	wave?	Is	it	even	an	object?’	Of	course,	one	could	simply	refuse	to	answer	such	questions,	insisting	that	to	do	so	would	take	us	beyond	what	can	be	legitimately	grounded	in	the	relevant	physics.	But	I	suspect	that	many	would	feel	that	in	so	refusing	the	realist	hasn’t	really	lived	up	to	the	name	and	that	our	understanding	of	how	the	world	is	remains	thin	and	impoverished.			 And	of	course,	even	appealing	to	the	‘pure’	interpretation	of	T	invites	comparison	to	similar	interpretations	of	both	related	theories	and	its	predecessor.	The	term	‘electron’	for	example	is	freighted	with	certain	connotations	associated	with	its	deployment	in,	say,	classical	mechanics.	There	the	electron	is	regarded	as	a	particle	and,	further,	as	an	object	that	possesses	certain	properties	and,	further	still,	as	an	individual	object,	assemblies	of	which	can	be	statistically	considered	in	certain	ways	which	are	dependent	on	permutations	of	those	objects	being	counted.	Here	we	see	the	door	to	metaphysics	opening	wider	and	wider.	And	the	next	obvious	question	would	be	‘Well,	when	our	theory	T	is	quantum	mechanics,	is	the	electron	like	that?	Is	it	an	individual	object,	permutations	of	which	are	counted	in	the	appropriate	statistical	analysis	of	the	objects’	collective	behaviour?’	Now	again	the	metaphysics	eschewing	exemplar	based	realist	can	maintain	the	line	and	simply	utter	the	response	‘No.	It	is	not.’	But	that	is	going	to	invite	obvious	further	questions	and	refusing	to	spell	out	in	some	metaphysical	terms	how	the	world	is	such	that	permutations	of	electrons	do	not	count,	or	make	a	relevant	difference,	is	again	going	to	leave	us	with	only	the	thinnest	of	understandings	(indeed,	one	that	is	cast	in	largely	negative	terms).		 An	alternative	is	to	eschew	metaphysics	as	it	is	currently	formulated	and	adopt	some	form	of	‘bespoke’	metaphysics	constructed	to	directly	clothe	the	relevant	features	of	modern	science.	We	have	been	here	before	of	course.	One	example	is	that	of	Whitehead,	who	drew	on	the	early	(or	‘old’)	quantum	theory	and	its	apparent	‘vibratory’	features	to	motivate	his	process	philosophy	(see	for	example	Whitehead	1926;	for	a	recent	consideration	of	this	motivation	see	Epperson	2004).	Another	would	be	Eddington,	who	took	the	above	feature	of	quantum	statistics	in	particular	(that	is,	its	permutation	invariance)	to	motivate	a	form	of	structuralism	according	to	which	objects	are	not	prior	to	but	on	a	par	with	the	relevant	relations	and	subsequently	went	on	to	articulate	this	structuralist	metaphysics	in	the	context	of	what	can	be	considered	to	be	an	early	form	of	quantum	gravity	(Eddington	1946).	The	obvious	problem	with	such	a	move	–	which	is	evident	in	the	later	works	of	both	Eddington	and	Whitehead	–	is	that	such	a	bespoke	metaphysical	framework	must	be	elaborated	via	bespoke	terms,	concepts,	principles	and	categories	and	runs	the	risk	of	descending	into	incomprehensibility.		
	 Fortunately,	there	is	a	third	and,	I	would	argue,	more	reasonable	alternative:	treat	current	metaphysics	as	a	kind	of	toolbox	that	although	it	may	contain	some	devices	that	are	not	‘fit	for	purpose’	may	still	contain	others	that	the	realist	can	use	(French	2014;	French	and	McKenzie	2012	and	2015).	So,	although	we	might	conclude	that	notions	such	as	intrinsicality	or	principles	such	as	Leibniz’s	are	ruled	out	by	modern	physics,	there	may	be	others	that	we	can	adapt	to	fit.	Let	me	expand	on	an	example	from	(French	2014)	and	express	it	in	the	context	of	exemplar	based	realism.		
Symmetries,	Structure	and	Determinables	Consider	the	so-called	Standard	Model,	which	has	been	the	subject	of	much	discussion	in	the	popular	and	philosophical	literature,	especially	following	the	discovery	of	the	Higgs	boson.		The	overarching	framework	is	quantum	field	theory.	Here	the	non-counting	of	permutations	of	electrons,	for	example,	is	explicitly	built	into	the	theory	via	a	fundamental	symmetry	known	as	Permutation	Invariance,	expressed	mathematically	by	the	permutation	group.	This	yields	the	fundamental	division	of	‘elementary	particles’	into	the	kinds	fermions	(to	which	electrons	belong)	and	bosons	(to	which	photons,	for	example,	belong),	corresponding	to	two	of	the	irreducible	representations	of	the	permutation	group.	Quantum	field	theory	is	also	relativistic,	so	it	incorporates	the	symmetries	of	Minkowski	space-time	which	are	represented	mathematically	via	the	Poincaré	group,	the	irreducible	representations	of	which	yield	a	classification	of	all	elementary	particles,	with	these	representations	indexed	or	characterised	by	mass	and	spin	(the	invariants	of	the	group).			 Furthermore,	the	Standard	Model	is	a	gauge	theory,	represented	by	the	group	SU(3)	x	SU(2)	x	U(1)	via	which	further	relevant	symmetries	can	be	captured	within	the	theory.	What	this	means,	broadly	speaking,	is	that	the	Lagrangian	of	a	system	–	which	basically	captures	the	dynamics	–	remains	invariant	under	a	group	of	transformations,	where	the	‘gauge’	denotes	certain	redundant	degrees	of	freedom	of	that	Lagrangian.	Thus,	consider	electrodynamics,	for	example,	for	which	U(1)	above	is	the	relevant	gauge	symmetry	group	associated	with	the	property	of	charge	and	the	photon	(a	gauge	boson)	effectively	drops	out	of	this	requirement	that	the	theory	be	gauge	invariant.	Extending	this	requirement	to	the	other	forces,	we	obtain,	for	the	weak	nuclear	force,	the	SU(2)	symmetry	group	associated	with	isospin,	a	property	of	protons	and	neutrons,	and	for	the	strong	nuclear	force,		SU(3)	associated	with	the	colour	property	of	quarks.	Mass	is	then	accounted	for	via	the	Higgs	boson	associated	with	the	breaking	of	the	isospin	symmetry	of	the	unified	electro-weak	force.		 That,	crudely	sketched,	is	the	relevant	exemplar.	Now,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	appropriate	realist	stance	that	should	be	adopted	towards	this	exemplar	is	that	of	the	structuralist,	where	the	metaphysical	notion	of	‘object’	is	at	best	set	on	a	par	with	that	of	‘relation’	(Ladyman	and	Ross	2007)	or	removed	from	the	picture	altogether	in	favour	of	a	fundamental	conception	of	‘structure’	(French	2014).	The	obvious	question	that	has	been	asked	(repeatedly)	is	‘What	is	that	structure?’,	or	putting	it	more	generally,	‘What	is	the	world	like,	if	it	is	structural?”.	Again,	one	answer	would	be	to	write	out	the	details	of	the	Standard	Model	on	a	whiteboard	and	pointing,	insist	‘It	is	like	that!’.	As	before,	this	yields	a	thin	sense	of	metaphysically	informed	understanding.	An	alternative	is	to	
attempt	some	form	of	bespoke	account.	Thus	Eddington,	before	he	went	off	the	metaphysical	deep	end	as	it	were,	expressed	such	group	theoretically	described	invariances	in	terms	of	‘patterns	of	interweaving’,	which	at	least	is	evocative	if	not	perhaps	very	precise	(and	perhaps	not	really	very	bespoke,	given	the	connotations	associated	with	‘weaving’!).			 Instead	we	might	appeal	to	certain	devices	in	the	metaphysical	toolbox	to	help	capture	the	nature	of	‘structure’	in	this	context.	So,	consider	the	way	in	which	the	fundamental	properties	from	‘being	a	fermion’	to	charge	and	spin	‘drop	out’	of	the	above	symmetries.	This	is	a	core	feature	of	this	structuralist	view:	rather	than	considering	the	world	as	built	from	the	bottom	up,	as	it	were,	beginning	with	objects	that	have	properties,	between	which	there	hold	relations,	which	are	expressed	by	laws,	that	are	constrained,	in	some	sense,	by	these	symmetries,	the	structural	realist	inverts	that	order,	and	sees	the	relevant	metaphysics	as	proceeding	from	the	top	down,	so	that	we	take	the	symmetries	and	laws	as	fundamentals,	and	the	properties	to	be	derivative.	How	can	we	metaphysically	express	that	inversion	and	capture	the	relationship	between	the	above	symmetries	and	the	properties	that	drop	out	of	them?	One	tool	we	can	use	is	the	determinable-determinates	relation	(French	2014	Ch.	10).		 This	has	been	extensively	discussed	of	course	(for	an	excellent	overview	of	the	various	positions,	issues	and	concerns	that	have	been	raised,	see	Wilson	forthcoming)	and	the	central	idea	is	that	determinables	and	determinates	stand	to	one	another	in	a	certain	specification	relation,	as	the	determinable	‘colour’	does	to	the	determinate	‘red’,	or	the	latter	as	determinable	does	to	a	particular	shade	of	red,	or	as	mass,	qua	determinable,	does	to	a	specific	mass	value.	Part	of	the	extensive	discussion	here	has	focussed	on	the	nature	of	this	relation	but	the	crucial	point	is	that	it	relates	properties	that	are	more	or	less	specific,	relative	to	one	another;	so,	‘red’	is	more	specific	than	‘colour’	and	a	particular	value	of	mass	is	more	specific	than	‘mass’.	‘Increased	specificity’	is	just	one	of	the	features	of	the	determinable-determinate	relationship	that	Wilson	helpfully	lists	(ibid.,	pp.	8-9).	Others	that	also	motivate	its	deployment	in	this	case	include:	‘determinate	incompatibility’,	according	to	which	if	something	has	a	certain	determinate	of	a	given	determinable,	then	it	cannot	at	the	same	time	have	a	different	determinate	of	that	determinable	(at	least,	not	of	the	same	or	lower	specificity);	‘determinate	opposition’,	according	to	which	different	determinates	of	the	same	determinable	are	not	just	incompatible	but	are	relevant	alternatives	(so	‘red’	and	‘blue’	are	determinates	of	‘colour’	but	‘red’	and	‘square’	are	not);	‘requisite	determination’,	which	requires	that	anything	that	has	a	given	determinable,	must	have	some	determinate	of	it;	and	‘asymmetric	dependence’	which	states	that	for	any	determinable	of	some	determinate,	anything	that	has	that	determinate	must	have	that	determinable,	but	something	could	have	that	determinable	without	having	that	determinate	(so	anything	that	is	red	must	be	coloured	but	something	coloured,	may	not	be	red	of	course).			 Now,	the	suggestion	is	that	we	can	apply	this	metaphysical	tool	to	the	case	of	the	symmetries	that	the	structural	realist	takes	to	be	a	fundamental	feature	of	the	structure	of	the	world,	in	the	sense	that	we	regard	such	symmetries	as	relational	determinables	generating	determinable	properties	and	associated	determinate	values.	Thus,	consider	the	permutation	group,	mentioned	above:	this	encodes	a	range	of	possible	particle	statistics,	but	in	this	world	it	appears	that	only	two	of	those	determinates	are	manifested,	namely	
those	corresponding	to	the	kinds	fermion	and	boson	(yielding	Fermi-Dirac	and	Bose-Einstein	statistics	and	characterised	by	anti-symmetric	and	symmetric	state	functions,	respectively).	Likewise,	the	symmetry	of	relativistic	space-time,	characterised	by	the	Poincaré	group	can	be	regarded	as	a	determinable	which	also	yields	spin	as	a	property-determinable,	which	in	turn	yields	the	property	spin	½,	associated	with	the	electron	for	example,	as	a	determinate.	Again,	it	is	through	the	determinable	(with	the	emphasis	on	the	-able)	that	the	relevant	possibilities	are	encoded	(French	2014,	p.	283).	So,	being	a	fermion,	say,	is	more	specific	than	being	subject	to	permutation	symmetry,	so	we	have	increased	specificity;	and	being	a	fermion	and	being	a	boson	are	not	just	incompatible	but	are	relevant	alternatives;	and	anything	that	is	subject	to	permutation	symmetry	must	behave	according	to	some	particle	statistics,	whether	fermionic,	bosonic	or,	but	not	apparently	in	this	world,	parastatistical.	Finally,	of	course,	anything	that	is	a	boson	is	subject	to	permutation	symmetry	but	something	that	is	subject	to	the	latter	may	not	be	a	boson	–	it	could	be	a	fermion,	for	example.		
 Now	applying	this	device	to	help	flesh	out	the	metaphysics	of	structure	raises	a	number	of	issues.	First	of	all,	some	have	argued	that	increased	specificity	feature	implies	that	determinates	must	be	metaphysically	prior	to	or	more	fundamental	than	determinables	and	if	this	were	accepted,	we	could	not	take	permutation	symmetry	to	be	prior	to	and	more	fundamental	than	bosonic	or	fermionic	statistics.	And	hence	we	could	not	take	that	symmetry	to	be	a	feature	of	the	fundamental	structure	of	the	world,	in	line	with	the	core	shift	of	structural	realism	from	objects	possessing	properties	to	relations	and	structures.	But	this	argument	is	problematic,	not	least	because	there	is	a	lacuna	that	has	to	be	filled:	what	has	specificity	to	do	with	fundamentality?	(French	ibid..,	p.	284)	And	this	lacuna	needs	to	be	filled	in	a	non-question	begging	way:	so,	it	is	not	going	to	impress	the	structural	realist	to	insist	that	maximal	specificity	corresponds	to	fundamentality	because	maximally	specific	determinates	are	the	properties	possessed	by	objects,	such	as	elementary	particles.	Nor	is	it	going	to	persuade	the	non-Humean	structuralist	by	insisting	that	maximally	specific	determinate	properties	are	categorical	and	only	categorical	properties	can	be	in	the	fundamental	base.	Such	a	structuralist	takes	her	structure	to	be	modally	informed	and	thus	has	no	qualms	about	admitting	modality	into	the	fundamental	base.	Finally,	it	might	be	objected	that	reality	must	be	maximally	determinate	else	we	allow	a	form	of	ontic	vagueness	to	enter	the	world	(Wilson	op.	cit.,	p.	14)	and	as	Lewis	reminded	us,	‘[t]he	only	intelligible	account	of	vagueness	locates	it	in	our	thought	and	language.’	(Lewis	1986,	p.	212).	But	Lewis’	claim	is	highly	contentious	of	course,	and	quantum	physics	has	again	been	appealed	to	in	order	to	motivate	arguments	that	the	world	is	ontically	vague,	in	a	certain	respect	(French	and	Krause	2003).	Note	that	this	is	still	in	accord	with	the	weaker	claim	that	there	cannot	be	only	determinable	features	of	the	world	(Wilson,	op.	cit.	p.	14).	The	structure	of	the	world	incorporates	both	determinable	and	determinate	features,	such	as	the	distinct	bosonic	and	fermionic	kinds	and	the	specific	spin	of	the	electron,	which	Wilson	refers	to	as	‘existential	witnesses’.			 Not	only	can	we	use	metaphysics	as	a	constructive	tool,	but	we	can	also	use	it	as	a	contrastive	one.	Thus	to	get	a	(hopefully)	clearer	picture	of	the	view	being	presented,	and	of	the	way	in	which	the	determinable-determinate	relation	can	help	as	a	metaphysical	tool	in	fleshing	out	that	picture,	let	us	compare	it	to	Paul’s	recent	development	of	a	‘one-category’	ontology	(2012;	2013).		
	 She	begins	with	the	core	question	that	obviously	resonates	with	the	structural	realist:	‘What	is	the	fundamental	structure	of	the	world?’	(2012,	p.	221).	Answering	this	question	is	a	partly	metaphysical	project,	where	that	metaphysics	is	informed	and	constrained	by	science	but	not	governed	by	it.3	Thus,	by	‘	fundamental	structure’	here	she	understands	fundamental	constituents,	from	which	all	else	is	constructed	via	some	‘building	rule’,	and	the	fundamental	categories,	which	are	determined	by	the	fundamental	kinds	or	natures	of	things.	In	the	balance	that	has	to	be	achieved	between	metaphysics	and	science,	the	latter	will	determine	what	we	take	to	be	the	fundamental	constituents	of	the	world,	in	terms	of	the	physical	properties,	structures	and	objects	that	should	be	regarded	as	‘perfectly	natural’,	to	use	Lewis’	phrase.	But	metaphysics	will	take	the	lead	in	determining	both	the	rule	by	which	things	are	composed	out	of	these	constituents	and	the	nature	of	the	latter,	in	the	sense	of	determining	the	fundamental	categories	to	which	they	can	be	assigned.		 So,	for	the	‘building	rule’	she	takes	composition,	on	the	grounds	that	we	have	a	direct,	intuitive	grasp	of	proper	parthood	which	forms	the	heart	of	the	composition	relation.	Here	immediately	the	likes	of	Ladyman	and	Ross	might	object	that	such	intuitions,	based	as	they	are	on	naïve	view	of	‘everyday’	objects	or,	at	best,	classical	mechanics,	fail	utterly	when	it	comes	to	modern	physics	where	the	notion	of	being	a	part	of	is	much	slipperier	and	harder	to	grasp.			 However,	when	it	comes	to	the	fundamental	categories,	Paul	does	draw	on	certain	features	of	quantum	physics	to	argue,	first,	that	we	should	reject	what	she	calls	the	‘traditional	spatiotemporal	view’	that	runs	throughout	much	of	contemporary	metaphysics	and	which	‘…takes	some	or	all	of	the	fundamental	constituents	of	the	world	to	be	spatiotemporal	parts,	i.e.,	chunks	of	spacetime,	many	of	which	are	qualitatively	rich,	and	the	building	relation	to	be	spatiotemporal	composition.	’		(ibid.,	pp.	233-234).	And	here	she	acknowledges	that	the	fault	of	such	a	view	is	that	it	conflates	the	metaphysics	of	the	everyday,	or	‘manifest	image’	with	that	of	‘the	real’	(ibid.,	p.	239)	Secondly,	and	more	importantly	for	my	purposes,	she	maintains	that	we	can	still	retain	‘the	world-building	relation’	but	now	applied	to	a	different	set	of	fundamental	categories.			 Thus	Paul	collapses	the	category	of	property	into	that	of	substance	(2013).	On	her	view	the	world	is	built	from	n-adic	properties	via	property	composition,	which	effects	a	kind	of	fusion	or	bundling	(2012,	p.	242)	and	since	this	‘mereological	bundle	theory’	does	not	require	this	fundamental	category	to	include	spatio-temporal	properties,	it	can	accommodate	a	much	broader	range	of	possibilities	when	it	comes	to	the	nature	of	the	fundamental	entities.	And	since	‘…every	fundamental	physical	theory	ever	given,	including	all	of	those	currently	on	offer,	is	or	can	be	couched	in	terms	of	properties	and	relations,	even	if	these	properties	and	relations	are	extremely	abstractly	specified		…’	(ibid.,	p.	245),	such	theories	will	mesh	with	this	particular	metaphysics.			 This	is	certainly	an	attractive	metaphysics	and	it	is	for	that	reason	that	it	acts	as	a	useful	contrastive	tool.	The	contrast,	of	course,	comes	from	Paul’s	reading	of	physical	theories	as	couched	in	terms	of	properties	and	relations	and	the	concomitant	insistence	on	a	metaphysical	‘bundling’	or	property	composition	relation.	Although	the	former	is	obviously	true	to	a	certain	extent,	this	reading																																																									3	Paul	explicitly	considers	how	metaphysical	realism	meshes	with	scientific	realism	(2012,	p.	232)	
omits	the	crucial	role	of	laws	and	symmetries.	Indeed,	if	we	take	this	role	seriously	in	the	context	of	the	Standard	Model	say,	then	it	would	seem	that	although	Paul	has	gone	some	way	in	the	right	direction	by	dropping	spatio-temporal	composition,	she	still	retains	an	overall	‘bottom-up’	approach.	At	the	very	least	mereological	bundle	theory	needs	to	be	able	to	accommodate	the	relationship	between	symmetries	and	kinds,	as	in	the	case	of	permutation	symmetry	and	the	boson/fermion	distinction,	and	properties,	as	in	the	case	of	Poincaré	symmetry	and	spin,	say.			 Paul	herself	explicitly	invites	the	structural	realist	to	adopt	her	mereological	bundle	theory,	on	the	grounds	that,	‘…	structuralists	can	make	good	use	of	an	n-adic	property	mereology,	since	they	don’t	need	substances	or	even	monadic	properties	in	order	to	construct	the	world.’	(2012,	p.	248;	see	also	2013	pp.	110-111).		Indeed,	she	suggests,	such	a	marriage	would	lead	to	a	‘super-sophisticated	structuralism’	(2013,	p.	111)	that	avoids	certain	of	the	problems	that	its	less	sophisticated	form	is	held	to	face.4	The	idea	then	is	that	we	take	relations	as	constituting	our	fundamental	base	and	then	apply	bundling	as	the	appropriate	building	relation,	thereby	effectively	constructing	the	structure	of	the	world	via	fusion	(Paul	2012	p.	245),	with	putative	objects	as	‘nodes’	in	this	structure,	or	as	Cassirer	put	it,	as	‘intersections’	of	these	relations.			 Understood	this	way,	mereological	bundle	theory	would	be	in	effect	a	further	metaphysical	tool	that	the	structural	realist	could	use	(see	French	2014,	pp.	186-189).	However	the	issue	of	how	to	accommodate	symmetries	remains.		If	they	are	viewed	as	merely	‘by-products’	of	laws,	expressing	certain	features	of	the	latter	then	with	laws	themselves	expressing	the	relations	that	sit	in	the	fundamental	base,	mereological	bundle	theory	might	seem	the	appropriate	metaphysical	device	for	accommodating	the	relevant	structure	construction.	On	this	account,	each	such	relation	would	exhibit	a	certain	feature	that	when	‘fused’	to	create	the	network	of	relations	that	the	laws	of	physics	describe	manifest	the	global	features	that	we	describe	via	symmetries.	Of	course,	further	work	is	required	to	‘mesh’	this	metaphysics	with	the	physics.			 In	particular	it	might	be	objected	that	in	the	practice	of	physics,	symmetries	act	as	constraints	on	laws,	or	as	‘meta-laws’,	which	suggests	more	of	a	‘top	down’	stance,	in	contrast	with	Paul’s.	Now	of	course,	one	could	respond	that	this	might	be	correct	when	it	comes	to	the	heuristic	use	of	symmetries	but	that	doesn’t	require	that	they	be	regarded	as	‘standing	above’	laws,	metaphysically	speaking.	A	third	way	between	these	two	extremes	is	to	follow	Cassirer	and	take	symmetries,	laws	and	measurement	results	as	being	on	a	par	and	together	constituting	the	structure	of	the	world	(French	2014).	This	removes	the	necessity	of	adopting	either	a	‘bottom	up’	or	‘top	down’	stance	towards	symmetries	but	of	course	the	relationship	between	them	and	the	properties	typically	taken	to	be	monadic	must	still	be	accommodated.	In	particular,	although	it	might	be	regarded	as	merely	‘loose	talk’	to	say	that	a	property	such	as	spin	‘drops	out’	of	Poincaré	symmetry,	the	close	relationship	here	on	the	physical	side	needs	to	be	matched	by	a	similar	relationship	on	the	metaphysical.		
																																																								4	Her	emphasis	on	n-adic	properties	as	fundamental	also	resonates	with	Mertz’s	ontology,	which	has	also	been	taken	to	be	a	suitable	metaphysics	for	OSR	(see	Mertz	2016).		
	 Consider	again	permutation	symmetry	and	the	distinction	between	bosons	and	fermions.	One	could	begin	with	that	distinction	as	fundamental,	so	that	quantum	entities	possess	‘being	a	boson’	or	‘being	a	fermion’	as	kind	properties.	Bundling	such	properties	together	yields	the	relevant	feature	of	assemblies	of	such	entities	that	is	represented	by	either	the	bosonic	or	fermionic	representation	of	the	permutation	group,	respectively.	And	the	fact	that	this	group	yields	other	representations,	corresponding	to	paraparticle	statistics,	for	example,	is	primarily	of	mathematical	rather	than	physical	significance	–	unless	of	course,	such	statistics	turns	out	to	be	physically	realized	(as	was	suggested	for	a	short	time	in	the	case	of	quarks),	in	which	case	the	relevant	group	representation	would	be	applied	(so	this	comes	down	to	an	issue	in	the	applicability	of	mathematics),	but	metaphysically,	of	course,	according	to	mereological	bundle	theory	we	would	still	begin	with	‘being	a	paraparticle	(of	a	certain	order)’	and	build	up	from	that.		 The	alternative	is	to	begin	with	the	symmetry	itself	as	part	of	the	fundamental	base	and	take	the	‘dropping	out’	of	bosonic	and	fermionic	statistics	to	express	the	relationship	between	this	symmetry,	as	part	of	the	fundamental	structure	of	the	world,	and	these	kind	properties.	In	terms	of	the	mathematics	this	amounts	to	no	more	than	the	relationship	between	the	group	and	its	representations	but	this	obviously	needs	to	be	matched	on	the	metaphysical	side.	Here	the	determinable-determinate	relationship	seems	to	do	the	job,	so	that	‘being	a	boson’	or	‘being	a	fermion’	are	simply	determinate	aspects	of	that	partly	determinable	structure.	Note	the	further	contrast	with	mereological	bundle	theory:	instead	of	a	‘building	relation’	we	have	something	akin	to	a	‘manifestation	relation’	and	instead	of	thinking	of	the	structure	as	built	up	from	certain	parts	(even	if	these	are	properties	and	relations	rather	than	objects	and	substances),	we	are	invited	to	think	of	it	as	given	holistically,	as	it	were,	and	as	manifesting	certain	determinate	features.5			 Another	way	of	seeing	the	contrast	between	this	and	Paul’s	approach	is	to	consider	the	question	of	what	should	be	our	attitude	towards	the	other	possible	properties,	such	as	‘being	a	paraparticle’	for	example.	According	to	mereological	bundle	theory	we	begin	our	construction	with	the	properties	that	we	actually	discover	in	the	world,	such	as	‘being	a	boson.’	We	represent	those	properties	mathematically	via	group	theory	and	we	find	that	such	mathematics	includes	alternatives	that	do	not	appear	to	be	realized	–	from	this	perspective	these	are	just	so	much	‘surplus	structure’.	According	to	the	alternative,	this	‘surplus’	represents	certain	possibilities	which	may	or	may	not	be	actualized	and	the	determinable	nature	of	the	structure	flags	the	point	that	it	encodes	such	possibilities.	Thus	rather	than	beginning	with	the	actual,	and	building	up	from	that,	we	begin	with	what	is	modally	allowed	and	show	how	the	actual	world	fits	into	that,	as	a	determinate	manifestation	of	that	modally	informed	structure.			 There	is	more	to	say	here,	of	course,	but	this	is	perhaps	enough	to	highlight	the	differences	between	these	metaphysical	tools.	6		
Conclusion																																																									5	In	a	sense	still	be	spelled	out,	this	stance	sits	somewhere	between	metaphysical	nihilism	and	monism.	6	Paul	herself	remarks	that	she	finds	Wilson’s	defence	of	determinables	‘interesting	and	plausible’	(2012,	p.	245	fn	22).			
	I	began	by	sketching	recent	moves	towards	a	more	local	or	‘exemplar	based’	form	of	realism	and	suggesting	that	such	moves	do	not	preclude	the	adoption	of	a	structuralist	stance.	However,	if	we	are	to	take	this	move	seriously	then	we	need	to	pay	close	attention	to	the	relevant	exemplars,	one	such,	in	the	context	of	modern	physics,	being	the	Standard	Model	with	its	emphasis	on	certain	symmetry	principles.	The	exemplar	realist	is	then	faced	with	the	issue	of	spelling	out	how	the	world	is	according	to	that	model.	One	option	is	just	to	point	to	the	relevant	physics	and	insist	‘it	is	like	that!’,	but	that	is	obviously	unsatisfactory.	The	alternative	is	to	treat	current	metaphysics	instrumentally,	as	a	kind	of	toolbox	and	apply	certain	devices	in	an	effort	to	generate	a	sense	of	understanding	how	the	world	could	be	that	way.	Focussing	on	the	issue	of	capturing	the	relationship	between	such	symmetry	principles	and	certain	properties,	I’ve	presented	two	such	‘tools’:	the	determinable-determinate	relationship	and	mereological	bundle	theory.		The	former,	I	think,	does	a	better	job	in	meshing	with	the	physics,	but	the	latter	cannot	be	discounted.	And	there	may	be	other	devices	that	can	be	used	as	well.	The	point	is,	if	we	are	going	to	‘go	local’	and	focus	on	the	particularities	of	a	given	set	of	exemplars,	whether	historical	or	current,	then	in	adapting	our	realism	to	those	particularities	there	must	be	an	even	greater	emphasis	on	spelling	out	what	this	realist	stance	commits	us	to,	in	terms	of,	as	Paul	puts	it,	not	only	the	fundamental	constituents,	but	the	categories	they	fall	under	and	the	kinds	of	relations	that	hold	between	them.	With	particular	metaphysical	tools	adapted	to	particular	exemplars,	this	overall	approach	may	reinvigorate	and	strengthen	the	currently	strained	relationship	between	metaphysics	and	science.			
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